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Abstract 
 
Purpose 
This research investigates the relationship between the extent and focus of 
supplementary narrative commentary (SNC) on amounts reported in the primary 
financial statements and board structure variables. 
 
Design/Methodology/Approach 
The study uses the disclosure index methodology to measure the extent of SNC in 
annual reports of 167 FTSE 250 companies. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
analysis is employed to examine the association between the extent and focus of SNC 
and board structure variables. 
 
Findings 
The findings show that the extent of SNC on amounts reported in the primary 
financial statements is about 30%, suggesting that companies provide commentary on 
a small number of amounts reported in the financial statements. In terms of focus of 
SNC, companies provide greater SNC on amounts in the income statement relative to 
the balance sheet. The regression results indicate that the extent of SNC is negatively 
associated with board size, and positively associated with audit committee 
independence and financial expertise. Focus of SNC is negatively related to audit 
committee independence and finance expertise. 
 
Originality/Value 
The research contributes to both the voluntary disclosure and impression management 
literature streams. The findings provide evidence of the extent and focus of SNC on 
amounts in the financial statements. They also demonstrate that board structure 
variables are related to the extent and focus of SNC on amounts in primary financial 
statements. These findings have implications for policy makers who have 
responsibilities for ensuring that users of annual reports receive adequate information 
to make decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we investigate supplementary narrative commentary (SNC) on amounts 
reported in the primary financial statements1 using a sample of UK listed companies. We 
take advantage of the delineation of narrative information into complementary and 
supplementary commentary by the ASB (2006) and International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB, 2010). Making this distinction, the ASB (2006) notes, on the 
one hand, that complementary narrative information provides useful financial and non-
financial information about the business and its performance that is not reported in the 
financial statements (emphasis added) but which, the directors judge, might be relevant 
to members’ evaluation of past results and assessment of future prospects. On the other 
hand, supplementary narrative information provides additional explanations of amounts 
recorded in the financial statements (emphasis added) and explains the conditions and 
events that shaped the information. Both ASB (2006) and IASB (2010) suggest that 
supplementary narrative disclosures are an important dimension of the information set 
underpinning the decision-usefulness of financial statements. In addition, the 
Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP, 2010) also points to the usefulness of 
supplementary narrative commentary and emphasises the need to explain the key 
points in the company’s performance and position, whether it is good or bad. 
Furthermore, the Companies Act 2006 requires companies to provide supplementary 
explanations on amounts reported in the primary financial statements to aid 
shareholders in their assessment of company performance and financial position.  
Similarly, the academic literature also argues that SNC is important to investors 
as it provides a means of clarifying the financial statements numbers (Cole and Jones, 
2005). Abarbanell and Bushee (1998) and Cole and Jones (2005) argue that 
explanations on changes to amounts reported in the primary financial statements 
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compared to previous year provide market participants with better insights into 
whether the changes represent good or bad news. For example, an increase in debt 
might either be good news (Harris and Raviv, 1990) or bad news (Miller and Rock, 
1985). To the extent that no supplementary commentary is provided on the increase in 
debt, investors would not know the reasons for such an increase. Other studies show 
that supplementary commentary affects share price returns (e.g., Kyeyune, 2010; 
Tauringana et al., 2011) and helps private unsophisticated users to understand the 
financial results better because it is couched in non-technical language (Bartlett and 
Chandler, 1997).2 In spite of this, in the UK, management has considerable discretion 
regarding supplementary commentary provision. The only requirement by the 
Companies Act 2006 (section 417) states that the business review must, ‘where 
appropriate, include references to, and additional explanations of, amounts included in 
the company’s annual accounts’ without further guidance on which or how many of 
the amounts should be commented on. This discretion provides an interesting setting 
to investigate because there are likely to be greater variations in commentary among 
companies. 
There is much literature investigating disclosure in different media, and the 
impact of corporate governance and company-specific factors on such disclosures. For 
example, some studies have examined aggregate disclosure (e.g., Barako et al., 2006; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Others have focused on specific disclosure types such as 
management earnings forecasts (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005); social information 
(Said et al., 2009); environmental information (Liu and Anbumozhi, 2008); and 
intellectual capital information (Li et al., 2008). These studies provide important 
insights into disclosure practices and their relation with corporate governance factors, but 
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the results are mixed and suggest that different types of disclosure may be influenced by 
different factors (see Barako, 2007).  
Our study extends the literature by focusing on SNC, an important type of 
disclosure which is useful to the capital markets (ASB, 2006; Tauringana et al., 2011), 
but for which evidence is limited. Although the impression management studies 
examined supplementary commentary, they have focused mainly on revenues, profit 
and earnings per share (see Aerts, 1994; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003) so that there is 
no comprehensive evidence on SNC. Additionally, these studies have focused on 
examining the self-serving behaviour of managers in explaining performance. In this 
regard, our study has three objectives. First, we examine the extent to which UK 
companies provide SNC on amounts reported in the primary financial statements. 
Second, we analyse the extent to which there is SNC focus in the commentaries on the 
primary financial statements. We define SNC focus as the propensity to provide SNC on 
more amounts reported in one primary financial statement relative to the other. This is 
supported by the impression management literature (Abrahamson and Park, 1994; 
Clatworthy and Jones, 2003), which suggests that managers have incentives to use 
corporate reports to ‘manipulate the perceptions and decisions of stakeholders’ (Yuthas 
et al., 2002, p. 142). In this context, we argue that managers may focus their commentary 
on amounts in the financial statement that shows good performance, thus portraying 
themselves in good light. Finally, we examine whether differences in the extent and 
focus of SNC can be explained by differences in corporate governance mechanisms, in 
particular board structure variables. In this context, we investigate whether boards of 
directors take actions that increase SNC, but curtail SNC focus.  
 Our sample consists of 167 companies selected from the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE)’s FTSE 250 index. We measure SNC using the disclosure index 
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methodology (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Mangena and Pike, 2005). We find that 
approximately 30% of the amounts are commented on. This implies that the absence 
of specific requirements by the Companies Act 2006 and/or guidance by the ASB 
(2006) means that users of annual reports may be denied useful information. In terms 
of SNC focus, we observe that companies comment more on income statement 
amounts relative to balance sheet amounts, suggesting that there is propensity to 
explain financial performance more than financial position. After controlling for 
company size, age, analyst following and industry, the regression results indicate a 
positive relation between the extent of SNC and audit committee independence and 
financial expertise, but negative relation with board size. We find no significant 
relationship between SNC and the proportion of non-executive directors. Our results 
show that SNC focus is negatively related to audit committee independence and 
financial expertise, but has no significant relation with board size and proportion of 
non-executive directors. Overall, these results are consistent with previous research 
suggesting effective boards improve the quality of financial reporting (e.g., Mangena 
and Pike, 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005).  
 Our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, we provide 
the first time evidence on the extent and focus of SNC on amounts reported in the 
primary financial statements. Second, we contribute to the literature by providing 
evidence on the relationship between the extent and focus of SNC and board structure 
variables. These issues have not been addressed in prior literature.  
  The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we summarise the 
literature and develop the hypotheses in Section 3. We discuss the research methods in 
Section 4, and in Section 5, we present and discuss the empirical findings. The final 
section is a summary and conclusion. 
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2. Literature Review 
Barton and Mercer (2005) suggest that SNC is an important element of a company’s 
disclosure policy. There are many reasons why managers might want to provide 
supplementary narrative commentary. Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) group the 
reasons into two perspectives. One perspective is that SNC overcomes information 
asymmetries between managers and outsiders (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Merkl-Davies 
and Brennan, 2007). Information asymmetry arises from the separation of ownership 
from control in companies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which increases agency costs 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) suggest that enhanced 
disclosure reduces information asymmetry. In this context, the provision of SNC can be 
seen as an attempt by managers to reduce information asymmetry, and helping improve 
investor understanding of the results, thus increasing the liquidity of the shares and 
lowering the cost of financing (Barton and Mercer, 2005).  
The second perspective is that managers have incentives to provide 
supplementary commentary to exploit the information asymmetries and engage in 
impression management (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Barton and Mercer, 2005). 
Impression management refers to the process by which individuals attempt to control the 
impression of others (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). In corporate reporting, 
impression management occurs when management selects information to display and 
presents the information in a manner that distorts readers’ perceptions of corporate 
achievements (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). This implies that management behave 
opportunistically and provide self-serving information to enhance the capital market 
perceptions of their abilities and company’s prospects (e.g., Clatworthy and Jones, 
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2003). In the context of SNC, managers may have a propensity to provide more SNC on 
amounts in the financial statement that show them in good light.  
    
3. Hypotheses development 
The board of directors is responsible for monitoring managerial performance in 
general (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), and in particular, the financial reporting 
processes (Mangena and Pike, 2005). In the context of financial reporting, the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2012, p. 17) points that the board of directors has 
the ‘responsibility to present a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of the 
company’s position and prospects’. Similarly, the Companies Act 2006 (section 417) 
also requires that in the business review, the board should provide a balanced and 
comprehensive analysis of financial performance and position of the company. Aerts 
and Tarca (2010) argue that the provision of supplementary explanations is a key 
component of board accountability, suggesting that the balanced and comprehensive 
analysis should include SNC. As Coles and Jones (2005) point out, SNC on amounts 
reported in the financial statements aids investors to gain a better understanding of 
both financial performance and financial position of the company. Schaffer (2002) 
and Barton and Mercer (2005) also suggest that SNC can help the board of directors 
in their monitoring and evaluation of managerial performance. For example, the board 
might use them to assess managerial performance compared to previous year as well 
as monitor or judge achievement of objectives set out. Consequently, we argue that 
effective board structures (i.e., board size, non-executive directors and audit 
committees) will enhance the extent of SNC and reduce the extent of SNC focus.  
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3.1 Board size  
The link between board size and disclosure has been investigated by only a few 
studies (e.g. Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Said et al., 2009). The argument is that 
larger boards are more likely to be endowed with a greater range of expertise, thus 
enhance effective monitoring of management actions (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). 
In contrast, the benefits of large boards may be offset by the incremental cost of 
poorer communication and decision making inefficiencies that are associated with 
large groups (Dalton et al., 1999). This means that with dispersed opinions and non-
cohesiveness in viewpoints, boards that are too large may actually have diminished 
monitoring capabilities (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). These contrasting views 
suggest that the effects of board size on the extent and focus of SNC are not clear. 
However, the limited empirical evidence suggests that there is no significant relation 
between board size and voluntary disclosure (see Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Said 
et al., 2009). Nevertheless, given the contrasting views, we make no directional 
prediction on the relation between board size and SNC. Thus: 
H1: There is an association between board size and the extent of SNC on amounts 
reported in the primary financial statements. 
H2: There is an association between board size and the extent of SNC focus on 
amounts reported in the primary financial statements. 
 
3.2 Proportion of Non-executive Directors 
A number of studies have linked the proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs) to 
disclosure (e.g., Eng and Mak, 2003; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007) and 
management earnings forecasts (e.g., Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 
2005). These studies suggest that NEDs have incentives to protect shareholder 
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interests against managerial opportunism. In this respect, we suggest that NEDs may 
take actions that encourage more SNC on amounts in the primary financial statements 
(1) to comply with the requirements of the Companies Act 2006 and the 
recommendations of the ASB (2006) and (2) to aid their assessment of managerial 
performance (Schaffer, 2002; Barton and Mercer, 2005). In addition, given their 
responsibility to provide a balanced assessment of the financial performance and 
position, NEDs are more likely to discourage SNC focus.  
Empirically, some studies support a positive relation with disclosures (see 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Ajinkya et al., 2005). Others show no significant 
relation with interim disclosures and statements of best practice (e.g., Mangena and 
Pike, 2005; Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). Nevertheless, we hypothesise the 
following: 
H3: There is a positive association between the proportion of non-executive directors 
and the extent of SNC on amounts reported in the primary financial statements  
H4: There is a negative association between the proportion of non-executive 
directors and the extent of SNC focus on amounts reported in the primary 
financial statements.   
 
3.3 Audit Committee  
The board of directors performs its monitoring activities by delegating important 
oversight duties to relevant board committees (Mangena and Pike, 2005; Karamanou 
and Vafeas, 2005). In terms of financial reporting, the audit committee (AC) has the 
delegated responsibility to ensure the quality of the financial reporting processes 
(Smith Committee, 2003; Mangena and Pike, 2005). The Smith Committee (2003) 
suggests that the effectiveness of the AC is enhanced when the AC is independent and 
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has financial expertise. The issue of AC independence draws from the widely 
accepted notion that independent directors are more likely to be effective monitors of 
management actions (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983). Carcello and Neal (2003) argue 
that an independent AC is more likely to be free from management influence in 
ensuring the quality and credibility of the financial reporting process. Given the 
importance of SNC to capital market participants (see ASB, 2006; IASB, 2010), we 
suggest that an independent AC would enhance the provision of this type of 
information and reduce the level of SNC focus. Empirical evidence shows a positive 
relationship between AC independence and disclosure (Mangena and Pike, 2005; 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2007) and management earnings forecasts (Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005; Ajinkya et al., 2005). Thus we hypothesise: 
H5: There is a positive association between audit committee independence and the 
extent of SNC on amounts reported in the primary financial statements 
H6: There is a negative association between audit committee independence and the 
extent of SNC focus on amounts reported in the primary financial statements.   
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2012) recommends the AC should 
comprise members with knowledge of the business environment, and, at least one AC 
member should have recent and relevant financial experience. Knowledgeable AC 
members are in a better position to understand (1) the capital market implications of 
providing quality disclosures (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Mangena and Pike, 
2005) and (2) the implications of compliance with regulatory requirements and best 
reporting practices (Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). This should lead to 
improvement in disclosure, including the provision of SNC in the financial 
statements. Prior empirical studies indicate a negative relation between financial 
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expertise and financial statements fraud (e.g., Abbott et al., 2000), earnings 
management (Klein, 2002); dismissal of auditors after issuing a going concern report 
(Carcello and Neal, 2003), and a positive relationship with disclosure (Mangena and 
Tauringana, 2007). Hence: 
H7: There is a positive association between AC finance expertise and the extent of 
SNC on amounts reported in the primary financial statements 
H8: There is a negative association between AC financial expertise and the extent of 
SNC focus on amounts reported in the primary financial statements.   
 
4. Research Methods 
4.1 Model specification 
To examine the association between the board structure variables and the extent and 
focus of SNC in the primary financial statements, we specify the following two 
multiple regression models: 
 
SNC  =  0 + 1BDSZ + 2NEDS + 3ACIN+ 4ACFE+ 5COSZ + 6ANFG  
+ 7GEAR + 8PRFT + 9LQDT +10COAG+ j     (1) 
 
SNC FOCUS  =  0 + 1BDSZ + 2NEDS + 3ACIN+ 4ACFE+ 5COSZ + 
6ANFG + 7GEAR + 8PRFT + 9LQDT +10COAG+ j   (2) 
 
We define all the variables in Table I. Drawing from prior research, we control for a 
number of other variables that are linked to disclosure. These are company size 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002); analyst following (Hope, 2003); gearing (Schwartz and 
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Soo, 1996); profitability and liquidity (Barako, 2007) and company age (Li et al., 
2008) 
 
 
  INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2 Data and Sample selection 
We collected data for our analyses from three sources. SNC measures and all board 
structure and control variables, except for analyst following and company age, were 
collected from the annual reports published during the year 2007. For analyst 
following and company age, we collected data from ShareScope and LSE, 
respectively. Our sample was drawn from the LSE, in particular all the non-financial 
FTSE 250 companies listed as at 31 December 2007. The FTSE 250 companies are 
likely to be more widely owned, thus exhibiting greater separation of ownership and 
control (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). In these companies, voluntary disclosures are 
likely to be more critical in reducing information asymmetries between management 
and shareholders. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Mangena and Tauringana, 
2007), we eliminated 77 financial companies (such as banks, insurance) because they 
face additional disclosure and corporate governance requirements, which may not be 
faced by non-financial companies. We then downloaded annual reports for the 173 
remaining companies from the individual companies’ websites. Following this, we 
eliminated two companies that were taken over and three that changed their 
accounting period during the period covered by our study. We expect these events to 
trigger the provision of more SNC to explain their effects on the amounts in the 
primary financial statements. We further eliminated one more company because it has 
negative equity and we considered it to be an outlier. The final sample used in this 
study is 167 companies.  
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4.3 Measuring supplementary narrative commentary 
We measure the extent of SNC using a disclosure index methodology (e.g., 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Owusu-Ansah, 2005). We first developed a checklist of all 
the items required to be disclosed on the face of the primary financial statements from 
an analysis of the requirements of UK and international accounting standards.3 This 
process yielded a total of 44 items, as indicated in Table II.  
 
                                            INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE 
 
To measure the extent of SNC, a company is awarded a score of ‘1’ for the presence 
of SNC on the relevant amounts, and ‘0’ otherwise. In identifying the SNC, we read 
the narrative section of the annual report. Unlike previous studies, the issue of item 
applicability is not a problem in our study because SNC relates to specific amounts in 
the primary financial statements. For example, if the item, ‘finance costs’, is included 
in the income statement, then the expectation is that it should be commented on and 
hence applicable to the company. This means that if a narrative commentary is not 
provided, the company is awarded a ‘0’ score.  On the other hand if the item, ‘finance 
costs’, is not included in the income statement, then the item is considered not 
applicable and scored accordingly. After scoring all the items, the SNC score for each 
company is computed as an index by dividing the company’s total score (i.e., the sum 
of all the 1’s) by the maximum possible score for the company. For each company, we 
create four SNC indices: overall SNC index, income statement SNC index, balance 
sheet SNC index and the SNC focus index (see Table I for definitions).4 The scoring 
of all annual reports was conducted by one well-experienced coder. However, a 
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second coder randomly selected 10% of the sample (17 annual reports) and 
independently scored the reports. The correlation coefficient between the scores of the 
two coders was 0.99, suggesting that the scores are reliable.  
 
5. Empirical Findings   
5.1 Descriptive statistics  
The summary descriptive statistics for SNC, board and control variables are presented 
in Table III. In terms of SNC, we provide descriptive statistics for the overall as well as 
for the two individual primary financial statements: income statement and balance 
sheet. The mean level of overall SNC on amounts in the primary financial statements is 
30.2%. These results suggest that companies provide SNC on a small number of 
amounts in the primary financial statements. This, perhaps, reflects the loose 
Companies Act 2006 section 417(8) requirements, that leave decisions to management 
discretion. As noted earlier, the Act does not specify how many items or which 
amounts in the primary financial statements companies are required to provide 
supplementary commentary on.  
With regard to the individual primary financial statements, Table III shows that 
companies provide more SNC on amounts in the income statement relative to the balance 
sheet. The mean SNC in the income statement is 42.3% compared to 20.1% in the 
balance sheet. These results are also reflected in our SNC focus measure with a mean of 
2.659, reflecting the propensity by managers to explain more income statement amounts 
relative to balance sheet amounts. This suggests that companies may not be providing a 
balanced assessment of financial performance and financial position. There are two 
possible explanations for this focus. One, from the perspective of the impression 
management literature, management might be commenting on income statement amounts 
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because performance is good, and wants to portray themselves in good light (Clatworthy 
and Jones, 2003).  Alternatively, managers know that the most read financial statement by 
both analysts and individual investors alike is the income statement (e.g. Bartlett and 
Chandler, 1997; Black and White, 2003) and therefore are responding to this need for 
information 
 
                                           INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE 
 
Table III also presents summary statistics for the board structure and control variables. 
The mean board size consists of about nine directors and the mean proportion of non-
executive directors is 56%. The results also show that on average 81% of AC members 
are independent and 38% have financial expertise. The percentage of AC members with 
financial expertise is slightly higher than the 30% reported by Mangena and Tauringana 
(2007) (using data collected in the 2002 interim reports), suggesting the number of AC 
members with financial expertise has increased over time. As for the control variables, 
the mean company size (market capitalisation) is £1,048.9 million and the mean number 
of analysts is five. The means for the other variables are as follows: gearing ratio (1.07), 
average profitability (15.4%), liquidity ratio (1.58) and company age (21 years).   
 
5.2 Regression results and discussion 
In Table IV, we provide the Pearson product-moment correlation matrix among 
the independent variables.  
 
INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE 
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An examination of the correlations among our independent variables suggests no 
multicollinearity problems exist. Field (2005) suggests that multicollinearity becomes 
a problem only when the correlations exceed 0.80 or 0.90. As Table IV shows, all the 
correlations are below these threshold values. We also examine the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) (not tabulated) to further test for multicollinearity and all are well 
below the threshold value of 10 (see Field, 2005). 
In Table V, we present the results of the four multiple regression models.5 Our 
data-set is not normally distributed, and therefore we run these regressions using 
normal scores (Cooke, 1998). Column 2 of Table V presents the model results of the 
relation between board structure variables and the overall SNC index. Columns 3 and 
4 present the model results of the relation between the board structure variables and 
the SNC measures in the individual primary financial statements, that is, the income 
statement and balance sheet, respectively. Finally, in column 5, we present the results 
of the relation between SNC focus and the board structure variables. Our results 
indicate that all four models have significant explanatory power. The Adjusted R² 
ranges from 17.2% for the income statement index to 29.2% for the overall SNC 
index. The Adjusted R² of 25.0% for the balance sheet (column 4) suggests that our 
model explains variations in the balance sheet supplementary commentary better than 
it does for variations in the income statement (with adjusted R² of 17.2%). The F-
ratios for all the models are significant.  
 
INSERT TABLE V ABOUT HERE 
 
We first focus on the extent of SNC (columns 2 to 4). With regard to the overall 
SNC (Column 2), the results in Table V show that board size, AC independence and 
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finance expertise are associated with SNC at the 5% level or better. Thus our 
hypotheses 1 (H1), 5 (H5) and 7 (H7) are supported. The coefficient of proportion of 
non-executive directors is, however, not significant, hence hypothesis 3 (H3) is not 
supported. In terms of the individual primary financial statements, we find that AC 
independence and financial expertise are positively associated with commentary in 
both the income statement (Column 3) and the balance sheet (Column 4) at the 5% 
level or better. The coefficients of board size and proportion of non-executive 
directors are not significant. Taken overall, our results suggest that companies with 
effective board structures provide SNC on more amounts in the primary financial 
statements.  
The findings of a negative association between board size and the extent of SNC 
contradict Cheng and Courtenay (2006) and Said et al. (2009) who report no 
significant association. Nevertheless, our results support the argument that larger 
boards are not effective monitors of management (Dalton et al., 1999), and may not 
enforce high level of commentary on amounts in the primary financial statements. Our 
results indicating that AC independence and financial expertise are positively 
associated with SNC are consistent with previous studies (e.g., Kelton and Yang, 
2008). This implies that AC independence and expertise are important in ensuring 
transparency and improve monitoring of financial reporting (Carcello and Neal, 
2003). Additionally, the results support the recommendations contained in the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2012) that ACs should be composed of 
independent non-executive directors and members with financial expertise.  
For the control variables, we find that company size is related to overall, income 
statement and balance sheet SNC consistent with previous studies (e.g. Mangena and 
Pike, 2005; Li et al., 2008). Analyst following is not related to overall supplementary 
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commentary, but is negatively related to the balance sheet statement and positively 
related to income statement supplementary commentary. Gearing ratio and company 
age are related to balance sheet supplementary commentary at the 10% level or better 
and 1% level or better, respectively. We find no significant relation with profitability 
and liquidity.  
Finally, in respect of SNC focus (Column 5), we find that the coefficients of AC 
independence and financial expertise are negative and significant at the 5% level or 
better. Hence, our hypotheses 6 (H6) and 8 (H8) are supported. However, both board 
size and proportion of non-executive directors are not significantly related to SNC 
focus, thus hypothesis 2 (H2) and 4 (H4) are not supported. These results are 
interesting and suggest that when the AC is independent and has financial expertise, 
the propensity for managers to provide commentary on more amounts in the income 
statement relative to balance sheet amounts may be curtailed. In this case, the results 
suggest that the presence of AC members who are independent and with financial 
expertise might result in a balanced commentary on amounts in the primary financial 
statement. In terms of the control variables, SNC focus is negatively related to 
company size and company age at the 5% and 1% level or better, respectively. The 
relation between analyst following and supplementary narrative focus is positive at 
the 1% level or better, implying that companies with large analysts following provide 
more commentary on amounts in the income statement. This perhaps reflects the 
attempt by management to provide information to meet the demands of analysts (see 
Barker, 1998; Mangena et al., 2007). Overall, these results suggest that the propensity 
to provide SNC on more income statement amounts relative to balance sheet amounts 
is lower in companies that (1) have effective AC structures, (2) are large, and (3) have 
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a long history of stock exchange listing, but higher in companies with greater analyst 
following.  
 
6. Summary and Conclusion  
The focus of this study was to investigate the extent and focus of SNC on the 
amounts reported in the primary financial statements in the annual reports. We also 
investigated the relation between the extent and focus of SNC and board structure 
variables, in particular board size, proportion of non-executive directors, audit 
committee independence and financial expertise. We find that companies provide 
SNC on a small number of amounts in the primary financial statements. Our results 
show that companies are more inclined to provide SNC on amounts reported in the 
income statement relative to the balance sheet amounts, raising doubts about whether 
companies provide a balanced assessment of company performance and position. We 
find that SNC is negatively related to board size, but positively related to AC 
independence and financial expertise. We also find that AC independence and 
financial expertise are negatively related to SNC focus, suggesting that effective audit 
committees may encourage a more balanced supplementary commentary.  
These results should be interpreted in the light of the fact that our model has 
explained only a very small amount of the variation in the extent and focus of SNC. 
Also while the use of SNC mitigates the problem of item applicability associated with 
previous disclosure studies, the limitation of our approach is that we assume that 
companies have to provide commentary on all amounts in the primary financial 
statements. It is possible that an amount in the financial statements has remained 
largely unchanged, and with no material changes, managers might perhaps find little 
need to comment. Further, the study examined the extent and focus of supplementary 
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narrative commentary using annual reports only. Potentially, some of the changes to 
amounts in the financial statements may have been explained through other media.  
In spite of these limitations, our study makes some important contributions to 
disclosure literature. First, the study provides the first evidence on the extent and 
focus of SNC on amounts in the primary financial statement. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no existing study that specifically examines supplementary 
narrative commentary as defined by the ASB (2006). The findings on SNC focus are 
new as no study has examined this issue before. These results contribute to the 
impression management literature in a different setting. Second, we also contribute to 
existing literature by providing evidence of the extent to which UK companies are 
responding to the requirements of the Companies Act 2006 and recommendation by 
ASB (2006) to provide SNC. The findings that companies provide supplementary 
commentary on a small number of the amounts reported in the primary financial 
statements suggest that companies can do more to inform investors in terms of the 
reason for changes to the amounts. We suggest that further guidance might be needed 
on which amounts to provide comment on in order to improve disclosure. Third, the 
finding of a relation between SNC and board size, AC independence and financial 
expertise contributes have implications for corporate governance policy makers.  
 
Notes 
1 ASB (1999), Chapter 7, identifies primary financial statements as the income statement, 
the statement of recognised gains and losses, balance sheet and cash flow statement. 
2 Unlike sophisticated investors such as analysts and institutional investors, who have 
access to management (see Holland, 1998), unsophisticated investors have no access 
to management to ask for explanations of changes to amounts in the primary financial 
statements. Hence they rely on supplementary commentary given in the annual report 
to appreciate the reasons for changes in company financial position and performance. 
3 Although UK FTSE250 companies adopted IFRS on 1 January 2005, they continued to 
prepare a statement of recognised gains and losses. This was in line with the ASB (1999) 
Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting. For the period covered by the study, 
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there were no requirements by IAS to prepare a statement of gains and losses. However, 
effective January 2009, IAS 1 (revised) requires a statement of comprehensive income. 
4 In our analyses, we incorporated the items in the statement of recognised gains and 
losses into the income statement and those in the cash flow statement into the balance 
sheet. Our reason for this is that the number of items in each of these statements is very 
small. 
5We re-run these regressions including industry dummies following Mangena and 
Tauringana (2007) and our results remain similar. 
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Table I: Definition of variables included in the regression model 
Variable(s) Definition 
Supplementary Commentary Measures 
SNC Overall supplementary 
narrative commentary 
Supplementary narrative commentary on amounts in the primary 
financial statements measured as an index computed by dividing 
the total number of amounts (items) on which a commentary is 
provided  by the company scaled by the total possible number of 
amounts (items) applicable to a particular company.  
SNC 
FOCUS 
Supplementary narrative 
commentary focus 
Defined as the propensity to provide supplementary narrative 
commentary more on amounts in one primary financial statement than 
the other, and is measured as the income statement supplementary 
narrative commentary score scaled by the balance sheet 
supplementary narrative commentary score for the company.  
Corporate Governance Variables 
BDSZ Board size Board size is measured by the total number of directors on the 
board as at the end of the year. 
NEDS Proportion of non-executive 
directors 
Proportion of non-executive directors is measured by the number of 
non-executive directors on the board scaled by total number of 
directors on the board (as a percentage). We do not distinguish 
between independent and non-independent non-executive directors. 
ACIN AC independence Audit committee independence is measured by the number of 
independent non-executive directors on the audit committee scaled 
by the total number of directors on the audit committee (as a 
percentage) 
ACFE AC financial expertise Audit committee financial expertise is measured by the proportion 
of the members of the audit committee who are identified as having 
financial expertise scaled by the  total number of directors on the 
audit committee (as a percentage). We consider audit committee 
members to have financial expertise if they hold an accounting or 
finance qualification. 
Control Variables 
COSZ Company Size The market capitalisation of the company at the financial year end.  
Market capitalisation is computed by multiplying the outstanding 
ordinary shares by the market share price at the balance sheet date.       
ANFG Analyst following Analysts’ following is measured by the number of analysts issuing 
EPS forecasts for the company as at balance sheet date. Data is 
collected from ShareScope 
GEAR Gearing Gearing ratio is measured as non-current liabilities at the end of the 
financial year scaled by book value of equity at that date. 
PRFT Profitability Profitability is measured by profit before interest and tax scaled by 
capital employed 
LQDT Liquidity Liquidity is measured by current assets scaled by current liabilities 
COAG Company age Company age is measured by the number of years the company has 
been listed on the London Stock Exchange as at balance sheet date. 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
Table II: Supplementary narrative commentary items 
Income statement  
   1 Revenue from continuing operations 
   2 Cost of sales from continuing operations 
   3 Gross profit from continuing operations 
   4 Other Income, e.g. profit from sale of plant and equipment 
   5 Operating costs - administrative and selling 
   6 Other Expense - e.g. loss from sale of plant and equipment 
   7 Finance income 
   8 Finance costs 
   9 Profit before taxation 
 10 Taxation 
 11 Profit from continuing operations 
 12 Profit attributed to equity holders 
 13 Profit attributed to minority interests 
 14 Earnings per share - basic and diluted 
 15 Dividend per share 
Statement of recognised gains and losses 
 16 
Income recognised directly in equity, e.g. foreign currency translations, goodwill amortisation, fair value 
gains and losses on tangible assets and financial instruments, etc 
 17 
Loss recognised directly in equity, e.g. foreign currency translations, goodwill amortisation, fair value 
gains and losses on tangible assets and financial instruments, etc 
 18 Transactions with owners: share issues and redemptions, dividends and the purchase of treasury shares 
Balance sheet  
 19 Property, plant and equipment 
 20 Investment property 
 21 Investments in joint ventures and associates 
 22 Deferred tax assets 
 23 Intangible assets, e.g. goodwill 
 24 Non-current financial assets, e.g. derivatives 
 25 Inventories 
 26 Current financial assets, e.g. derivatives 
 27 Trade and other receivables 
 28 Current tax assets 
 29 Cash and cash equivalents 
 30 Current financial liabilities, e.g. overdraft and derivatives 
 31 Trade and other payables 
 32 Current tax liabilities 
 33 Non current financial liabilities, e.g. derivatives, mortgages, vehicle financing 
 34 Retirement benefit obligations, e.g. pensions 
 35 Deferred tax liabilities 
 36 Provisions 
 37 Minority interest in equity 
 38 Issued capital 
 39 Share premium 
 40 Other reserves 
 41 Profit and loss 
Cash flow statement 
 42 Cash flow from operating activities 
 43 Cash flow from investment activities 
 44 Cash flow from financing activities 
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 Table III: Descriptive statistics (N=167)  
Variables¹ Mean Std dev Median 25% 75% Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Extent and Focus of SNC   
Overall supplementary narrative commentary .302 .0782 .310 .250 .360 .050 .530 -.167 .223 
Income statement supplementary narrative 
commentary 
.423 .1079 .400 .330 .4700 .070 .730 -.038 1.037 
Balance sheet supplementary narrative 
commentary 
.201 .0856 .220 .130 .260 .040 .430 .253 -.071 
Supplementary narrative commentary focus 2.659 1.9448 2.136 1.538 3.077 .765 15.000 3.227 13.359 
Board structure variables   
Board size 9.192 2.0911 9.000 8.000 10.000 5.000 20.000 1.375 4.173 
Proportion of non-executive directors .560 .1010 .560 .560 .630 .300 .833 -.105 -.266 
Audit committee independence .810 .3497 1.000 .750 1.000 .000 1.000 -1.557 .782 
Audit committee financial expertise . 380 .1886 .330 .250 .500 .000 1.000 1.198 1.909 
Control Variables   
Company size (Market cap) (£’Million) 1048.918 581.1937 884.500 560.180 1479.010 178.450 2547.980 .775 -.434 
Analyst following 5.521 2.8024 5.000 4.000 7.000 .000 14.000 .186 -.131 
Gearing 1.066 1.1771 .760 .350 1.450 .000 8.690 3.547 17.992 
Profitability .154 .2495 .130 .060 .200 -1.420 2.080 1.842 31.318 
Liquidity 1.577 3.6209 1.010 .720 1.350 .150 44.990 10.644 126.253 
Company age (Years of listing) 20.665 18.5909 13.000 6.000 34.000 .000 70.000 1.009 .149 
¹All variables are defined in Table 1.    
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Variable¹ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
 1. Overall supplementary 
narrative Commentary  
1.000            
2. Supplementary narrative 
commentary focus 
-.359*** 1.000           
 3. Board size  -.140* .012 1.000          
 4. Proportion of non-executive 
directors 
    .012 .069  -.004 1.000         
 5. Audit committee 
Independence 
  .332*** -.159**   .065  .065 1.000        
6. Audit committee financial 
expertise 
  .232*** -.138*  -.105  -.147*    .106 1.000       
7. Company size   .308*** -.232***   .050 .049 .200***   .028 1.000      
8. Analyst following   .363*** .427***   .007  -.010 .237*** .150* .240*** 1.000     
9. Gearing   .238*** -.141*   .013   .038 .257*** .131*     .080 .106 1.000    
10. Profitability  .033 .015   -.005  .010    -.028 .087   -.056    .047   -.099 1.000   
11. Liquidity  -.129* -.071  .009 -.048 -.167**  -.065     -.012 -.163** -.137*  -.071 1.000  
12. Company age   .310*** -.177**  -.054  -.044     .021   .025 .112 .218***     .014   -.078   -.118 1.000 
¹All variables are defined in Table 1 
***. Correlation is significant at the 1% level or better  
    **.Correlation is significant at the 5% level or better  
    *.Correlation is significant at the 10% level or better               
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Table V 
Regression results of supplementary narrative commentary on amounts in the primary financial statements 
 Overall 
supplementary 
narrative 
commentary 
Income 
statement 
supplementary 
narrative 
commentary       
Balance sheet  
supplementary 
narrative 
commentary 
Supplementary 
narrative 
commentary 
focus 
     
R²              .334              .222              .302              .331 
Adjusted R²              .292              .172              .258              .288 
Standard error              .066              .098              .074              .448 
F-ratio            7.836***            4.459***            6.764***            7.710*** 
Observations               167               167               167               167 
  
Variables¹,²  
Intercept               .051 
             (.718) 
              .087 
            (.817) 
            -.076 
           (-.958) 
          .383 
         (3.032***) 
     
Board structure variables  
Board Size             -.005 
        (-2.176**) 
            -.003 
          (-.759) 
           -.001 
           (-.443) 
            .021 
           (.370) 
Proportion of non-executive 
directors 
             .001 
            (.020) 
             .010 
            (.143) 
            -.060 
        (-1.111) 
            .087 
         (1.290) 
Audit committee independence              .057 
         (3.588***) 
             .033 
         (1.996**) 
             .061 
         (3.421***) 
           -.007 
        (-2.701***) 
Audit committee financial 
expertise  
            .068 
        (2.429**) 
            .127 
         
(3.027***) 
            .063 
         (1.983**) 
           -.004 
        (-1.989**) 
Company-specific control variables  
Company size             .030 
        (3.257***) 
            .033 
        (2.360**) 
            .039 
         (3.692***) 
           -.161 
        (-2.332**) 
Analysts following           -.003 
       (-1.419) 
            .008 
         (2.941***) 
           -.009 
        (-3.973***) 
            .030 
         (7.034***) 
Gearing            .009 
       (1.859*) 
            .011 
        (1.458) 
            .008 
         (1.725*) 
           -.104 
          (-.909) 
Profitability            .022 
        (1.044) 
          -.007 
         (-.233) 
            .028 
         (1.178) 
            -.205 
           (-.395) 
Liquidity          -.0001 
        (-.404) 
          -.002 
         (-.913) 
            .001 
           (.511) 
           -.045 
        (-1.224) 
Company age             .001 
       (4.168***) 
         .0001 
          (.343) 
            .001 
         (2.866***) 
           -.022 
        (-3.180***) 
*** Significant at the 1% level or better 
** Significant at the 5% level or better 
* Significant at the 10% level or better 
¹ All variables are defined in Table I 
² t-statistics are in parentheses 
 
 
 
